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Abstract
This study investigates the determinants of capital structure decisions by real estate firms, with
a specific focus on the impact of political risk on leverage. Using a sample of Asia-Pacific
REITs and listed property trusts, we find those firms with properties located in countries
characterized by relatively high degrees of political risk, such as political instability, and/or
greater uncertainty in the ability to repatriate and monetize profits from international investment
activities, employ less debt than their counterparts operating in more politically stable
environments. This core finding remains robust to alternative sample selection criteria
including the division of the sample into high versus low market-to-book value firms, and also

holds within the subset of organizations that are active in raising additional capital in the
secondary markets.
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Introduction
The past two decades have seen an enormous expansion of international real estate
investment opportunities, and unprecedented integration of related capital markets. These
emerging trends present both unique opportunities and challenges for real estate firms
investing across jurisdictional boundaries, and promise to significantly influence both the
strategic positioning and operational characteristics of such firms. While early work along this
dimension has focused on the trade-off between the costs and benefits of organizational
design characteristics, the current investigation focuses on how political risk exposure
influences a real estate firm’s ability to raise capital. Specifically, we argue REITs and listed
property trusts facing enhanced levels of political risk exposure will face difficulties securing
debt financing. As such, we posit these firms will be characterized by lower leverage, ceteris
paribus. From an operational perspective, these systematic differences in firm leverage ratios
are of key import to firm management as they may effectively constrain the investment
opportunity set available to international real estate firms.1
Two unique dimensions of the real estate market add substantively to the complexity of this
decision-making process and further motivate the use of this industry as a compelling
laboratory for examining political risk. First, despite the robustness of the aforementioned
emerging trends, real estate remains both a highly segmented and localized market. For
example, excess demand for apartments in China provides little, if any, value relevant
information regarding the profitability of the office market in Australia. To date, real estate
markets remain characterized by high degrees of both property type and geographic location
specificity. Accordingly, political risk engendered by cross-border investing activities is
becoming increasingly relevant with respect to investments in relatively illiquid, tangible assets
such as commercial real estate properties.
Second, the capital intensive nature of most real estate investment decisions adds an
additional layer of complexity to this decision making process. Given the relatively stringent
investment and payout regulations governing international REIT and listed property trust
markets, as well as barriers to capital flows across national borders, many international real
estate firms are effectively capital constrained (in the sense they have a limited ability to fund
growth internally through retained profits) and must rely on external financing to undertake
additional projects. As such, these firms are forced to borrow funds through either private or
public channels, or incur the potentially significant negative signaling consequences
associated with issuing equity capital. The purpose of the current investigation is to expand the
literature on determinants of firm capital structure, international real estate markets, and the
importance of location specific dimensions of portfolio risk on firm contracting decisions by
investigating how political risk influences the capital structure of Asia-Pacific REITs and listed

property trusts. Previewing our results, we find those firms with properties located in countries
characterized by relatively high degrees of political risk do, in fact, employ less debt than their
counterparts operating in more politically stable environments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Review of the Literature provides
background information on the growth and development of Asia-Pacific real estate markets,
while Determinants of Firm Capital Structure Decisions outlines the previously identified drivers
of firm capital structure decisions for both real estate and non-real estate related entities. Data
and Methodology describes the data and methodology used to investigate the relations
between political risk and firm debt, while the results of our empirical investigation are provided
and discussed in Analysis. Finally, Summary and Conclusions summarizes our key findings
and concludes.

Review of the Literature
Growth in the Asia-Pacific Real Estate Market
The evolution of the REIT industry in developed markets has established a solid framework for
the quick adoption and effective deployment of similar investment structures throughout the
Asia-Pacific region. However, there is a risk that these modern investment vehicles may
outpace the attitudes of prevailing political paradigms in certain developing countries. In
particular, the supreme laws that govern property rights in particular countries may lead to an
irresolvable conflict between investors and the political authorities. For instance, the Chinese
constitution dictates that all land in urban areas is owned by the State and all land in rural
areas is owned collectively by the inhabitants of that area unless otherwise specified by law
(Lou 2008). Such uncertainty regarding property rights and related concerns regarding the
ability of institutions to effectively repatriate and monetize the gains from international real
estate investing activities, represents a significant risk for Asia-Pacific real estate firms.
Despite these concerns, REITs and listed property trusts across the Asia-Pacific arena
continue to grow. Compared to the United States, where total REIT market capitalization has
increased markedly from 10 billion U.S. dollars (USD) in 1990 to over 600 billion USD by 2012,
the Asian REIT market has grown at an even higher rate. Specifically, Tan (2009) and Ernst
and Young (2010) estimate this market has grown from only 2 billion USD in 2001 to
approximately 68 billion USD by 2009, or nearly 2 ½ times faster than the U.S. based REIT
market.
Evidence suggesting this tremendous growth will continue across Asia-Pacific real estate
markets is readily observable from an examination of demographic trends. Conventional
wisdom posits that real estate development and population growth are positively correlated. As
detailed in Neo (2005), Asia accounts for approximately half of the world’s population.
Furthermore, the Asian region currently exhibits an increasing birth rate, while developed
nations across the rest of the world generally exhibit flat or declining birth rates. Thus, from a
global real estate investment perspective, the Asia-Pacific market seems well placed for
continued growth. Interestingly, particularly given these birthrate dynamics, an estimated 50 %
of the population in the four wealthiest regions in Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and

Hong Kong) will be over age 40, and hence of prime investment age. Additionally, the annual
household savings of this demographic is substantial and estimated to reach approximately
64,000 USD by 2020 (Neo 2005). Taken together, these figures strongly suggest the AsiaPacific REIT market is well positioned for continued growth for the foreseeable future.

Strategic Responses to Geographic Dimensions of Portfolio/Political Risk
Given both the rapid growth and evolving nature of this relatively young and highly regulated
market segment, firms operating within this dynamic marketplace must be proactive and
strategically position themselves to be ready and able to optimally capitalize on the
opportunities and mitigate the threats presented by this unique operating environment. Along
this dimension, a number of existing studies provide evidence that firms operating across
international boundaries systematically alter their capital structure in direct response to the
unique legal, regulatory, and operational risks engendered via international operations. For
example, both Lee and Kwok (1988) and Fatemi (1988) find that contrary to conventional
wisdom which posits large, internationally diversified corporations should exhibit reduced
bankruptcy costs and thus an enhanced debt capacity, multinational companies (MNC)
actually exhibit lower debt ratios than their smaller, purely domestic counterparts. Building
upon this foundation, Burgman (1996) concludes political risk, exchange rate risk, and
increased agency costs may all limit the debt capacity of multinational firms and help explain
the observed relations. Similarly, Doukas and Pantzalis (2003) conclude multinationals use
less debt, and argue this is driven by the increased agency costs associated with actively
monitoring a more geographically diversified set of operations. Continuing, Chen et al. (1997)
again document lower ratios for MNCs relative to their domestic counterparts, however, within
the subset of multinational firms they find leverage is actually positively related to the degree of
internationalization. Finally, and further complicating the discussion of international capital
structure issues, Reed et al. (2001) conclude that despite the above mentioned agency cost
and international risk dimensions, MNCs exhibit both higher credit ratings and a lower cost of
debt than domestic companies. Taken together, these findings suggest there is broad
agreement that international firms face unique complications which systematically influence
their capital structure related decision making.
While these findings indicate that simply operating in multiple countries may well impact a
firm’s capital structure, they ignore important operational differences across countries. This
suggests the need for a more detailed analysis of the drivers of the relation.2 More specifically,
emerging empirical evidence suggests firms within the Asia-Pacific real estate market
understand political risk, and alter their organizational structures as a result. For example, Sun
(2010) develops a theoretical model explaining how real estate firms select their investment
advisor. While conventional wisdom holds that internally advised investment companies enjoy
reduced agency costs, Sun demonstrates that depending upon available contracting options
and market conditions, externally advised firms may benefit from 1) reduced agency costs due
to reputational capital effects, 2) enhanced monitoring of individual property managers,
portfolio advisers, and other related professionals, or 3) efficiency gains. Thus, to the extent
political risk influences agency costs, monitoring capabilities, or the ability to realize gains from
such activities, political risk could influence the firm’s optimal organizational design. Consistent
with this notion, Cashman et al. (2013) also examine the strategic underpinnings of the advisor

choice decision. They conclude that the choice between internal and external advisement for
Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property trusts represents a strategic trade-off between the
agency costs associated with external advisement and the potential benefits associated with
capturing location specific soft information. Furthermore, as the opacity of soft information is
likely related to observable dimensions of political risk, the authors conclude the optimal
selection of internal versus external advisement, and hence organizational form, is inherently
linked to political risk.3 Taken together, the results presented in these papers strongly suggest
a firm’s choice of organizational form may well represent a value relevant, strategic decision,
driven by the business environment the real estate firm confronts.
Extending this paradigm, the current investigation examines an additional, potentially more
significant choice for real estate firms—the capital structure decision. Specifically, we posit that
political risk exposure resulting from a real estate firm’s investments across jurisdictions
influences the firm’s capital structure decision. Firms must balance the increased costs
associated with higher political risk exposure, including the likelihood of not being able to meet
their debt obligations and the resistance of lenders to provide additional financing on favorable
terms, against the higher returns offered by higher leverage and greater risk exposure. As
such, we hypothesize that Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property trusts with investment
property holdings concentrated in countries characterized by high levels of political risk will be
forced to strategically lower their debt ratios. Once again, such limitations effectively serve as
potential constraints upon management’s menu of available investment project options.

Determinants of Firm Capital Structure Decisions
Traditional Determinants of Firm Capital Structure
Over the past 50 years, three primary theories governing firm leverage and security issuance
decisions have become widely known and embraced throughout the general finance literature.
First, trade-off theory posits that a firm’s optimal capital structure is found by comparing the tax
benefits accruing from the use of debt against the potential increase in deadweight bankruptcy
costs associated with such actions.4 While widely accepted as a primary driver of capital
structure decisions for non-REIT firms, the relatively unique regulatory nature of real estate
investment trust markets around the world impose significant barriers to applying trade-off
theory to the real estate market. For example, one of the primary benefits of the REIT
organizational form is the ability to avoid, or at least reduce, taxes at the corporate/entity level.
Across the Asia-Pacific region, virtually every market offers non-trivial tax benefits to REITs in
exchange for compliance with regulatory conventions, such as substantial distribution (90 % or
more of taxable income) requirements.5 Given the ability of these firms to reduce, or avoid
entity level taxation, trade-off theory appears to offer little insight into why REITs would choose
to employ relatively high levels of debt.6
Second, the pecking-order theory articulated by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984)
posits that capital needy firms attempting to maximize long-run shareholder wealth will prefer
to issue equity when it is overvalued, while relying on debt financing when market values of
equity do not fully reflect intrinsic values. Sophisticated investors, cognizant of both their
information deficit regarding the firm’s intrinsic value and the aforementioned incentives for

firms to issue overvalued equity, are likely to discount offering bids for seasoned equity
issuances. As a result, firms with robust but informationally opaque operations and profit
expectations may strategically choose to avoid the potential negative signaling consequences
associated with equity issuance and disproportionately rely on debt financing.
Han (2006) suggests these signaling concerns may be particularly important for REITs, as
their assets are uniquely difficult to value. Specifically, given the highly segmented and
localized nature of commercial property markets, analysts must not only understand the nature
of the cash flows accruing to such investments, but must also be keenly aware of the
complications arising from holding illiquid assets subject to complex, opaque contracts and
regulations. Consistent with this notion, U.S. REITs have consistently been found to exhibit
higher debt ratios than their non-REIT counterparts.7
On the other hand, a number of compelling arguments also limit the applicability of peckingorder theory within real estate markets. For example, the aforementioned payout requirements
may severely hamper the ability of Asia-Pacific REITs to fund expansion activities via internally
generated profits. As a result, these firms may not have the same financing options as their
non-REIT counterparts. Empirical evidence supporting this contention is provided by Brown
and Riddiough (2003) and Ott et al. (2005) who both conclude REITs finance their long-run
development and investment activities by issuing debt and/or equity rather than relying on
retained earnings.8 Given the implicit capital constraints REITs operate under, they are
effectively pushed into the market more frequently than their non-REIT counterparts. As a
result, the market may well be more familiar with a typical REIT’s operational strategy, thereby
mitigating the negative signal generally associated with an equity issuance for a non-REIT firm.
Third, market-timing theory suggests firm security issuance decisions will be made strategically
by company insiders in an attempt to maximize value for their existing shareholders. As with
the pecking-order theory, security issuers are believed to rely upon debt financing when equity
is undervalued in the marketplace, while conversely choosing to disproportionately issue equity
when share prices are overvalued. Market-timing advocates believe that for informationally
opaque firms, deviations between market prices and intrinsic values are often sufficiently large
that informed insiders can effectively expropriate wealth from new investors to existing
shareholders.9
Within the real estate literature, the market-timing theory of capital structure decisions has
been investigated by at least three recent studies. Interestingly, the results of these studies are
somewhat difficult to reconcile. First, Feng et al. (2007) document a positive, rather than
negative, relation between lagged market-to-book ratios and current firm leverage. This result
is clearly at odds with the predictions of market-timing advocates. On the other hand, both
Boudry et al. (2010) and Harrison et al. (2011) find strong support for the market-timing theory
within their investigations of REIT security issuance decisions and aggregate debt levels,
respectively. Thus, we view the relevance of market timing for capital structure decisions within
real estate markets as an open empirical question.
Given the theoretical limitations of applying both trade-off theory and pecking-order theory to
real estate markets, as well as the mixed results from previous market-timing investigations,

ongoing empirical investigations of real estate company capital structure choices and security
issuance decisions are forced to rely upon a variety of firm level operating characteristics as
explanatory variables. Based upon the existing literature, four attributes have consistently
emerged as robust predictors of firm leverage: 1) asset tangibility, 2) firm size, 3) profitability,
and 4) growth options. We next describe the motivation and previous empirical evidence
supporting the inclusion of each of these traditional determinants of firm capital structure
choices.

Determinants of Firm Level Leverage Decisions
Asset Tangibility
A wealth of both theoretical and empirical investigations of non-REIT firm capital structure
decisions document a positive relation between the tangibility of a firm’s assets and the
organization’s debt capacity. Conceptually, real assets are generally viewed as providing more
effective collateral. Support for this paradigm can be found in numerous investigations
including, but not limited to, Myers (1977, 1984), Williamson (1988), Titman and Wessels
(1988), Jaffe (1991), Pulvino (1998), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Baker and Wurgler
(2002), Barclay et al. (2006), and Brown and Marble (2009). As such, throughout our empirical
analysis we control for the tangible nature of each firm’s assets using the ratio of total real
estate operations to total assets for each firm. Ex-ante, we expect a positive relation between
asset tangibility and firm leverage ratios.
Firm Size
Within the context of trade-off theory, Rajan and Zingales (1995) proffer that increasing firm
size should be associated with enhanced firm stability, thus decreasing bankruptcy costs. This
suggests larger firms should have a higher debt capacity. Similarly, Brown and Riddiough
(2003) argue that larger firms’ securities are both more stable and more liquid than those
offered by smaller firms. These characteristics also suggest a positive relation between firm
size and leverage.10
On the other hand, to the extent larger firms are more informationally transparent, peckingorder theory would suggest the negative signaling consequences of seasoned equity offers
would be substantively lower for larger firms. Thus, we might rationally observe a negative
relation between firm size and leverage. To capture the effect of firm size on leverage, we
include the natural log of each firm’s total assets as a control variable across all model
specifications.
Profitability
As with firm size, increased firm profitability may influence firm leverage through multiple
channels depending upon which capital structure theory dominates. Under trade-off theory,
enhanced profitability should reduce the probability of financial distress, lowering expected
bankruptcy costs, thus suggesting a higher debt capacity (and level) for more profitable firms.
Conversely, Rajan and Zingales (1995) posit that managers have a self-interested desire to

avoid the disciplining effects of substantive debt service requirements. As increasing
profitability should afford managers more flexibility and trust with senior management, more
profitable firms may well choose relatively lower debt levels.11
Finally, we also note that Baker and Wurgler (2002) contend the observed relations between
firm profitability and leverage are driven, in large part, by retained earnings. Given the limited
ability of REITs and listed property trusts to retain large amounts of profits, it is entirely
plausible that previously observed empirical relations between firm profitability and leverage
amongst non-REIT firms will be very weak, or non-existent, within real estate markets.
Growth Options
A number of empirical investigations also document a consistently negative relation between a
firm’s growth opportunities and leverage ratios. These studies include Myers (1984), ShyamSunder and Myers (1999), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Fama and French (2002), and Barclay et
al. (2006). Conceptual justification for such a relation dates to at least Myers (1977) who
argues high debt burdens create a potential debt overhang problem for corporate borrowers in
which firms rationally forgo positive NPV projects because the gains from undertaking such
investments accrue exclusively to debtholders. To avoid such perverse incentives, high-growth
firms may proactively scale back their use of financial leverage, thus inducing an observed
negative relation between firm leverage and growth opportunities.12
Real Estate Industry and REIT Specific Determinants of Firm Debt
While the four previously enumerated attributes have consistently been found to influence nonREIT capital structure decisions, additional determinants of capital structure decisions tend to
be industry and/or firm specific. For example, a number of investigations focusing directly on
the real estate market suggest a variety of additional attributes that may be significant in
explaining leverage decisions within this industry.
First, as noted by both Brown and Riddiough (2003) and Brown and Marble (2009), the liability
structure of a firm’s debt may influence their debt capacity. Interestingly, Brown and Riddiough
argue an increased level of secured debt within a firm’s capital structure is associated with an
increased probability of issuing equity, and hence secured debt is inversely related to firm
leverage. They further contend this relation is driven by the increased agency costs associated
with managing multiple classes of assets. Conversely, Brown and Marble (2009) develop and
test a theoretical model of secured debt usage and conclude secured debt increases a firm’s
debt capacity through its role in mitigating potential asset substitution problems. To the extent
collateralized debt deters firms from increasing the variance of their assets in place, risk
averse lenders will be more willing to provide additional debt financing.
Second, in a similar vein, Boudry et al. (2010) argue firms with greater access to public debt
markets should exhibit an enhanced debt capacity.13 Specifically, they argue firms with rated
debt already outstanding are likely characterized by relatively transparent assets and/or low
transaction costs associated with raising debt. Both alternatives suggest firms with outstanding
rated debt should be more readily able to raise additional debt on favorable terms. Third,

continuing along the asset transparency dimension, firms with split bond ratings are likely
informationally opaque, while older firms are likely informationally transparent.14 As such, we
expect firms with split bond ratings to be characterized by lower debt ratios, while older firms
may well enjoy an enhanced debt capacity.
Fourth, turning to alternative financing mechanisms, Harrison et al. (2011) conclude firms
actively repurchasing their own shares on the open market, by construction, will increase their
debt ratios. Additionally, such activities, within the context of pecking-order theory, should
provide a positive signal to the market about the firm’s long-run prospects, thus further
enhancing the firm’s debt capacity. Similarly, the authors also argue that both operating
leverage and the use of long-term capital leases effectively serve as substitute sources of
financial leverage. Therefore, firms characterized by high degrees of operating leverage and/or
extensive lease obligations should exhibit reduced leverage ratios using traditional accounting
based metrics.
Fifth, turning to regulatory and accounting transparency, Hartzell et al. (2008) demonstrate that
alternative regulatory considerations across jurisdictions can significantly impact firm level
decision making. As such, after controlling for firm size, we expect the enhanced regulatory
uncertainty associated with increasing the number of countries in which a firm owns
investment properties may impair the firm’s ability to attract credit and thus lower debt ratios.
Lastly, real assets associated with development activities may well be more tangible and
transparent than the lease contracts associated with managing real properties. As such, we
include a zero/one indicator variable identifying those firms actively participating in the
development of real property as opposed to generating revenue exclusively from operating
and/or managing existing facilities. Ex-ante, we expect real estate development firms to exhibit
an enhanced debt capacity.

Political Risk and Firm Leverage
As the central focus of the current investigation, we posit that political risk and uncertainty
materially influence firm capital structure decision making for real estate firms within the AsiaPacific region. This hypothesis is entirely consistent with the aforementioned findings of Fatemi
(1988); Lee and Kwok (1988); Burgman (1996); Chen et al. (1997); and Doukas and Pantzalis
(2003) on non-real estate firms. Within the context of Asia-Pacific real estate markets, we
argue that REITs and listed property trusts holding investment properties located in countries
with greater political risk or uncertainty will employ less leverage. Specifically, we contend this
observed reduction in firm borrowing will be due (in part) to an increased probability that these
firms will be unable to meet their debt service obligations. Furthermore, lenders rationally
responding to such increased risk exposure, would thus be expected to ration credit, thereby
reducing observable firm debt ratios.15
Political risk exposure can take a variety of forms, and hence, we include three alternative
metrics to assess the importance and robustness of the relation between political risk and firm
capital structure. First, enhanced political turmoil in countries associated with inefficient
governmental operations and/or poor election processes can increase the uncertainty of the

business and economic environment of a jurisdiction. This will increase the risk of projects
within the jurisdiction, and as a result increases the likelihood that the firm will be unable to
meet its debt service obligations. Additionally, we expect lenders to be more reluctant to
extend credit (on favorable terms) to real estate firms with properties located in countries
characterized by greater risk or uncertainty with respect to the efficacy of governmental
operations.
Second, separate and distinct from the concept of political efficiency is the concept of political
stability. More stable regimes allow for more effective forecasting and strategic planning on the
part of organizations. Therefore, in jurisdictions characterized by enhanced political instability,
we expect the firm’s forecasted cash flows will be less accurate, limiting that firm’s willingness
and ability to fully commit expected cash flows to service the debt. Similarly, we also expect
lenders will be less likely to extend credit on favorable terms when forecasted cash flows are
less reliable. As such, increased political instability should be associated with reductions in
observable firm debt ratios.
Finally, when making international real estate investments, firms are concerned not only with
the potential profitability of the proposed project, but also the ease with which the profits
generated by the investment may be repatriated to the firm’s home country. Once again, we
hypothesize that greater difficulty in extracting cash flows and profits from a given jurisdiction
increases the riskiness of the proposed investment project making it more difficult for a firm to
service its debt and reducing the willingness of lenders to extend credit. Once again, this
presumption leads us to expect political risk will be inversely related to a firm’s use of leverage.

Data and Methodology
We begin our empirical analysis by identifying all REITs and listed property trusts tracked by
SNL Financial that trade on the Australian Stock Exchange, Bombay Stock Exchange, Hong
Kong Stock Exchange, New Zealand Exchange Limited, Singapore Exchange, or Tokyo Stock
Exchange over the period 2000 through 2011. Table 1 presents the breakdown of these firms
based upon the country in which they are headquartered, and provides similar tabulations
based upon the geographic location of the individual properties owned by sample firms. In
total, our 187 sample firms hold ownership interests in over 8,000 individual properties.
Examining these distributions, we note that while relatively few sample firms are
headquartered in China (6 out of 187, or 3.2 %), Asia-Pacific real estate companies own
numerous properties (1,295; or 16.1 % of sample holdings) there. Japan is similarly overrepresented in terms of the ratio of property holdings to firm headquarter locations (31.1 % vs.
19.3 %), while conversely, Singapore serves as the home base for a disproportionately large
(42, or 22.5 %) number of companies given the relatively small number of investment
properties (675, or 8.4 %) owned by sample firms which are located there.
Table 1 Firm and property location breakdown
Country
Australia
China

# of R.E. firms
28
6

% of total
15.0 %
3.2 %

# of properties
1,599
1,295

% of total
19.8 %
16.1 %

Country
Hong Kong
Japan
Singapore
Other
Total

# of R.E. firms
47
36
42
28
187

% of total
25.1 %
19.3 %
22.5 %
15.0 %
100.0 %

# of properties
977
2,505
675
1,016
8,067

% of total
12.1 %
31.1 %
8.4 %
12.6 %
100.0 %

This table provides a breakdown of the headquarter locations of the real estate firms in our sample, as well as the
geographic location distribution of all properties owned by sample firms

Political Risk Variables
We next use the geographic location of each individual investment property held by every
sample firm to count the number of properties located in each country, and then calculate the
percentage of each firm’s property holdings located in each country. We then use the resulting
weights to calculate each firm’s property weighted average Political Rights (Efficiency) Index,
Political Change (Stability) Index, and R-Factor (Repatriation Index).16 These three measures
capture various aspects of political risk including: how well the political process functions, how
political changes will affect the firm’s ability to conduct business, and the firm’s ability to
transfer profits out of the country.
To further clarify each of these metrics, the Political Rights Index (Political) is provided by
Freedom of the World, and is based on surveys regarding: the electoral process, political
pluralism, and the functioning of the government. Higher Political scores represent a lower
functioning government. As such, we anticipate a negative relation between Political and firm
leverage. The Political Change Index and the R-Factor are both provided by Business Risk
Service. The Political Change Index (PCI) is a measure of how political changes in the country
will affect business operations, and the likelihood of change happening in the next 10 years.
Higher PCI scores represent a lower probability of political change and suggest that if political
change does occur it is less likely to significantly impact the business environment. As such,
we expect a positive relation between PCI and firm leverage. Lastly, the R-Factor, which
stands for remittances and repatriation of capital factor, is a measure of each country’s ability
and willingness to allow private foreign companies to repatriate their profits. Higher R-Factor
values imply it is easier to repatriate profits back to the home country of the REIT or listed
property trust. Again, given our hypothesis, we expect a positive relation between R-Factor
and firm leverage.

Business & Social Similarity Measures
While our primary focus is on the political risk associated with investing across international
borders, we recognize the need to control for the similarity between the social and economic
operating environments of each firm’s home country (headquarters) location and those
associated with the geographic location of their individual asset (property) holdings. Toward
that end, we include six additional control metrics. Our first three metrics, the minimum time (in
days) required to complete an export transaction, the minimum number of procedures required
to register a property, and the ratio of the domestic equity market capitalization to GDP are all

designed to capture the level of financial market development and business friendliness of the
regulatory environment. Our last three metrics, the number of broadband subscribers (per 100
people), the percentage of GDP which is spent on primary school education, and the female
participation rate in the labor force are all designed to capture alternative dimensions of the
social and cultural landscape faced by sample firms.
In operationalizing these metrics, we take the absolute value of the difference between the
headquarters country value and the property country value, respectively. We then weight the
difference by the number of properties located in each country to form a measure of similarity
between the countries in which the firm invests and the country in which it is headquartered. All
else equal, we expect differences across countries in these similarity metrics to manifest
themselves in the form of increased risk and uncertainty with respect to optimal operating
practices and customs, and thus be associated with a reduced debt capacity.

Financial/Regulatory Environment
To help ensure our model is truly capturing political risk and not simply identifying spurious
relations driven by the unique financial and/or regulatory environment faced by each firm, a
number of additional controls are also included throughout our model specifications. First,
following La Porta et al. (2004) we include a variable identifying the fraction of each firm’s
investment portfolio located in countries whose legal systems are based upon the foundational
tenets of (French and Roman) Civil Law as opposed to (British) Common Law. While La Porta
et al. (2004) conclude common law is generally more efficient in securing and enforcing
property rights, real estate companies investing across multiple international jurisdictions may
well prefer the enhanced certainty associated with Civil Law based systems, which tend to rely
more explicitly on the written text of the rules, laws, and regulations as opposed to location
specific customs which may well enhance property rights but be relatively opaque and difficult
for outside (i.e., non-local) investors to fully comprehend. As such, we leave the expected sign
of our legal foundations metric as an open empirical question.
Second, to account for potential variation across jurisdictions in the flexibility and openness of
each firm’s operating environment, we employ the Heritage Foundation’s Business Freedom
Index (BFI). Once again, for firms holding investment assets exclusively within a single
country, the BFI exclusively represents the index value for that country. For firms investing
across multiple jurisdictions, we weight each country value by the fraction of the firm’s
investment properties located in that country to derive the property weighted average BFI for
each firm. All else equal, we expect firms operating in less economically restrictive
environments to enjoy enhanced economic opportunities, and thus exhibit an increased debt
capacity.17
Third, in many nations across the globe, the local economic system is dominated by the
banking industry. Without broadly accessible, well-functioning equity markets, firms in such
countries may be forced to disproportionately rely on debt financing as the primary source of
new capital infusions into the firm.18 As such, we create a binary, indicator variable identifying
whether the country in which each firm is headquartered has an economic system which is

bank dominated or market dominated.19 Ex-ante, we expect firms with property holdings
concentrated in bank dominated countries to be characterized by higher leverage ratios.
Fourth, as borrowing may become relatively more attractive as interest rates decline, we
include the 10-year, constant maturity U.S. Treasury rate as a proxy for world-wide interest
rates. Fifth, as interest expenses on debt are generally deductible for federal income tax
purposes, while dividend payments to shareholders are not, we also include the corporate tax
rate corresponding to the country of incorporation for each firm.20 While in most industries
higher marginal tax rates would portend higher debt levels, given the tax advantaged nature of
most firms within our sample, we do not anticipate strong results along this dimension.
Sixth and finally, given the international context of the current investigation, we recognize that
firms reporting their financial statements following generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) may well be differentially difficult to value relative to their counterparts in the market
choosing to report their financial statements following the principle based international financial
reporting standards (IFRS). As such, we explicitly control for firm’s choice of primary
accounting convention throughout our empirical specifications.

REIT Specific Attributes
We also construct various controls which have been shown to be correlated with real estate
firm capital structure decisions. These variables were conceptually motivated above, and the
accounting/financial data used to construct each of these metrics was obtained directly from
SNL Financial. A detailed description of each variable’s construction is provided in the
Appendix.

Analysis
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics regarding each of the variables employed throughout
our empirical analysis. Examining the results in Table 2, we find the typical REIT within our
sample finances approximately 30 % (book value) to 40 % (market value) of its assets in place
using borrowed money. These leverage figures, while substantive, are approximately 10
percentage points lower than those found for U.S. based real estate investment trusts. Relative
to American firms, Asia-Pacific REITs also appear to be substantively larger, with Total Assets
averaging over $3.7 billion for sample firms. This figure, which is roughly twice the size we
would expect from a sample of U.S. based REITs, exhibits considerable variation around this
mean value, and is driven upward by a handful of very large Hong Kong based REITs,
including Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited. Median values along this dimension, while
unreported, are much more in line with U.S. based firms at approximately $700 million. Further
examination of the data in Table 2 reveals the typical firm recognizes a return on assets of
approximately 4.6 % annually. Roughly half of all outstanding Asia-Pacific REIT debt is
secured, while approximately 30 % of sample firms have rated debt outstanding. Finally, from
a regulatory and financial reporting risk perspective, the average real estate firm in our sample
owns investment properties in slightly more than two countries, with sample firms exhibiting a

small proclivity toward following IFRS (61.1 %) as opposed to GAAP (38.9 %) accounting
conventions.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable
Dependent variable
Market leverage
Book leverage
Political risk variables
Political rights index
Political change index
R-Factor
Business similarity measures
Time to export
Procedures required to register property
Market cap / GDP
Social/cultural similarity measures
Broadband per 100
% of GDP spent on primary education
Female participation in labor force
Financial/regulatory characteristics
Legal origin
Business freedom
Bank dominated
US 10-year rate
Tax rate
GAAP
General firm characteristics
Asset tangibility
Total assets
Profitability
Growth options
Lagged leverage
REIT specific attributes
Secured debt
Rated debt
Split bond ratings
Asset age
Repurchases
Operating leverage
Lease payments
Total countries
Development

Obs.

Mean

Std. dev. Minimum

Maximum

1,066 0.393
1,066 0.315

0.201
0.142

0
0

0.990
0.796

1,066 0.032
1,066 0.556
1,066 0.693

0.022
0.117
0.197

0
0.228
0.323

0.070
0.760
0.970

1,066 9.275
1,066 5.155
1,066 199.160

4.516
0.635
142.614

5
2
11.968

23.333
6
415.897

1,066 14.701
1,066 15.370
1,066 59.850

6.194
4.008
8.707

0.237
11.141
35.664

21.657
22.082
78.782

1,066
1,066
1,066
1,066
1,066
1,066

0.028
0.784
0.337
0.038
0.135
0.389

0.015
0.169
0.473
0.007
0.133
0.488

0
0.363
0
0.028
0
0

0.060
1
1
0.050
0.407
1

1,066
1,066
1,066
1,066
1,066

0.149
3,728,981
0.046
0.836
0.385

0.165
6,545,665
0.075
0.579
0.205

0.001
458
−0.917
0.027
0

1.760
53,082,180
0.486
5.575
0.985

1,066
1,066
1,066
1,066
1,066
1,066
1,066
1,066
1,066

48.402
0.311
0.058
4.243
0.012
1.482
0.0004
2.158
0.580

42.016
0.463
0.234
2.437
0.110
2.804
0.002
2.199
0.494

0
0
0
1
0
−4
0
1
0

100
1
1
10
1
8
0.028
13
1

This table provides basic descriptive statistics (sample size, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum)
for the variables considered in the analysis. Political Rights Index is based on surveys regarding the electoral

process, political pluralism, and the functioning of the government. Political Change Index is a measure of how
political changes in the country will affect business, and the likelihood of change happening in the next 10 years.
The R-Factor, which stands for remittances and repatriation of capital factor, is a measure of a country’s ability
and willingness to allow private foreign companies to repatriate their profits. The remaining variables are defined
in the appendix. We note that the reported similarity measures are based are raw numbers, and are not
differenced as in our multivariate analysis

Continuing, Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients between each pair of our political risk
measures. Not surprisingly, we find that political rights, political change, and R-Factor are all
significantly correlated. The negative correlation between political change and political rights is
a result of how the indices are constructed. A country with low political risk will have a high
political change score while a country with a better functioning political system will have a
lower political rights score. This difference in ordering is responsible for the negative
correlations. The R-Factor is only significantly correlated with political rights, and contrary to
the other indices suggests it is more difficult to repatriate profits from countries with wellfunctioning political systems. While we find statistically significant relations between our
political risk proxies, the magnitude of these relations is relatively low. This is not entirely
unexpected, as we view each proxy as capturing a different dimension of political risk.
Table 3 Political risk correlation matrix
Political rights
Political rights
Political change
R-Factor

1
–
−0.2605a
(0.00)
0.2088a
(0.00)

Political risk

1
–
−0.0288
(0.35)

R-Factor

1
–

This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients associated with the three measures of political risk
employed throughout this investigation. Political Rights Index is based on surveys regarding the electoral process,
political pluralism, and the functioning of the government. Political Change Index is a measure of how political
changes in the country will affect business, and the likelihood of change happening in the next 10 years. The RFactor, which stands for remittances and repatriation of capital factor, is a measure of a country’s ability and
willingness to allow private foreign companies to repatriate their profits
aIndicates statistical significance at 1 % level

Univariate Analysis
We next continue our analysis by comparing the amount of leverage used by firms with
relatively high versus low political risk exposure. Each year we rank firms into terciles based
upon their relative political risk exposure. More specifically, tercile rankings are constructed for
each of our three political risk measures. We then compare the mean leverage levels between
the firms in the low political risk tercile to those in the high political risk tercile. The results of
this analysis are presented in Table 4. As expected, regardless of how political risk is
measured, firms with more exposure to political risk utilize less leverage.

Table 4 Univariate analysis
Variable

Low risk exposure
Obs.
Mean

Political rights
Market lev
392
Book lev
392
Political change
Market lev
344
Book lev
344
R-Factor
Market lev
364
Book lev
364

High risk exposure
Obs.
Mean

Satterthwaite
T-test of differences

0.451
0.380

364
364

0.347
0.246

7.20a
14.56a

0.365
0.303

352
352

0.336
0.248

2.00b
5.46a

0.444
0.369

365
365

0.363
0.303

5.51a
6.13a

This table provides mean values and univariate tests of differences in means for our leverage measures
disaggregated by the firm’s relative political risk exposure. High Risk Exposure firms are those in the upper tercile
of Political Rights Index values, and the lowest tercile of both Political Change and R-Factor Indices, respectively
aIndicates statistical significance at 1 % level
bIndicates statistical significance at 5 % level

Multivariate Analysis
Next, we continue on to our multivariate examination of how political risk exposure influences
the capital structure of Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property trusts. Specifically, we examine a
firm’s use of leverage with the following general form regression:
Leverage=f(PoliticalRisk,Business&CulturalSimilarity,Financial/RegulatoryCharacteristics,Gene
ralFirmCharacteristics,REITSpecificAttributes,ϵ).
The results from these base case regressions are presented in Table 5. More explicitly, the
regressions are designed to examine our hypothesis that political risk exposure is inversely
related to leverage, as 1) the uncertainty associated with higher levels of political risk
increases the bankruptcy costs associated with debt, and 2) the increased uncertainty makes
debt financing more difficult, or expensive, to obtain. The results presented in Table 5 are
entirely consistent with our expectations, as market leverage tends to increase as political risk
decreases.21 In Model 1, we observe that when REITs invest in countries with better
functioning political systems, leverage increases. Continuing, Model 2 presents evidence that
as the perceived likelihood and potential impact of political change decreases, REITs take on
more leverage. Similarly, Model 3 demonstrates that as profits are more easily repatriated
back to the home country of the REIT, allowing them to more easily repay their domestic
lenders, the more leverage the REIT is able to carry. Lastly, consistent with Models 1 and 3,
our fully specified Model 4 results suggest that REITs employ more leverage when they invest
in countries with better functioning political systems and when they can more easily repatriate
profits.
Table 5 Determinants of market leverage for Asia-Pacific real estate companies
Variables
Intercept

(I)
0.290 (4.50)
a

(II)
0.261 (4.00)
a

(III)
0.341 (5.26)
a

(IV)
0.362 (5.87)
a

Variables
Political risk variables
Political rights index
Political change index
R-Factor
Business similarity measures
Time to export
Procedures required to register
property
Market cap / GDP
Social/cultural similarity measures
Broadband per 100 people
% of GDP spent on primary education
Female participation in labor force
Financial/regulatory characteristics
Legal origin
Business freedom
Bank dominated
US 10-year rate
Tax rate
GAAP
General firm characteristics
Asset tangibility
Total assets
Profitability
Growth options
Lagged leverage
REIT specific attributes
Secured debt
Rated debt
Split bond ratings
Asset age
Repurchases
Operating leverage
Lease payments
Total countries
Development
Observations
R-squared

(I)

(II)

(III)

−2.409a
(−3.13)

(IV)

0.116a (2.89)

−3.864a
(−3.83)
−0.056 (−0.70)
0.180a (4.68)

0.165a (2.78)

−0.028a
(−4.36)
0.064 (1.07)

−0.028a
(−4.33)
0.073 (1.32)

−0.024a
(−3.70)
0.094 (1.42)

−0.027a
(−4.28)
0.042 (0.64)

0.000 (1.44)

0.000 (0.57)

0.000 (0.76)

0.001b (1.72)

0.003 (0.20)
0.010 (0.79)
−0.001 (−0.11) 0.005 (0.64)
0.012b (1.84) 0.010b (1.74)

0.002 (−0.18) −0.002 (−0.15)
−0.003 (−0.36) −0.010 (−1.18)
0.013c (2.01) 0.011 (1.56)

−0.411 (−0.75)
−0.003 (−0.05)
0.080a (3.19)
−1.749b
(−1.78)
−0.012 (−0.20) −0.013 (−0.23)
0.007 (0.33)
0.011 (0.50)

−1.068 (−1.60)
−0.057 (−0.96)
0.073a (2.99)
−1.531 (−1.61)

−0.049 (−1.16)
−0.000 (−0.73)
−0.259a
(−4.81)
−0.117a
(−5.65)
0.499a (14.37)

0.006 (0.15)
−0.000 (−1.11)
−0.304a
(−5.78)
−0.114a
(−6.08)
0.504a (15.10)

2.692a (2.62)
0.071 (1.31)
0.038 (1.38)
−1.257 (−1.29)

−0.039 (−0.89)
−0.000 (−0.88)
−0.263a
(−5.04)
−0.114a
(−5.49)
0.503a (14.35)

3.089c (2.42)
−0.034 (−0.56)
−0.006 (−0.26)
−1.615b
(−1.67)
−0.062 (−1.12) −0.031 (−0.57)
−0.026 (−1.13) −0.027 (−1.24)
−0.030 (−0.73)
−0.000 (−0.19)
−0.260a
(−4.98)
−0.118a
(−5.87)
0.479a (13.71)

0.000 (1.53)
0.000 (1.49)
0.000 (1.50)
0.000c (2.38)
−0.015 (−1.31) −0.015 (−1.32) −0.016 (−1.33) −0.022b
(−1.93)
−0.004 (−0.21) −0.001 (−0.07) −0.019 (−0.93) −0.009 (−0.49)
−0.004b
−0.005c
−0.004b
−0.004b
(−1.70)
(−2.03)
(−1.83)
(−1.95)
−0.015 (−0.48) −0.024 (−0.80) −0.029 (−0.83) −0.021 (−0.63)
0.001 (1.07)
0.002 (1.22)
0.001 (0.86)
0.002 (1.25)
−1.723 (−0.94) −1.800 (−0.97) −2.237 (−1.16) −1.681 (−0.90)
0.005b (1.88) 0.006c (2.26) 0.005c (2.04) 0.003 (1.17)
0.010 (1.02)
0.010 (0.99)
0.020b (1.90) 0.021b (1.94)
1,066
1,066
1,066
1,066
0.699
0.697
0.697
0.707

Variables
Property type fixed effects

(I)
Yes

(II)
Yes

(III)
Yes

(IV)
Yes

This table presents the results of four regressions investigating the determinants of Asia-Pacific real estate firms’
use of leverage. The first three models regresses the firm’s Market Leverage against our three measures of
political risk separately, while controlling for the financial and regulatory standards, as well as firm and industry
level variables. In Model (1), the Political Rights Index is used. In Model (2) the Political Change Index is utilized,
while Model (3) employs the R-Factor. Model (4) includes all three of our political risk measures. The t-tests
reported in parenthesis are all based on standard errors clustered by firm
aIndicates statistical significance at 1 % level
bIndicates statistical significance at 10 % level
cIndicates statistical significance at 5 % level

In sum, the findings of Table 5 clearly suggest that REITs and listed property companies take
on more leverage when their investment properties are located in countries characterized by
less political risk and uncertainty. Thus, political risk appears to be an important dimension of
capital structure decision making for real estate firms within this region as firms strategically
respond to the increased bankruptcy costs associated with enhanced political risk exposure by
assuming less leverage.
While Table 5 examines the impact of political risk on market leverage, Table 6 replicates the
analysis examining book leverage. As in Table 5, we again find that political risk is significantly
related to firm capital structure.22 Consistent with expectations, Asian-Pacific real estate firms
facing more political risk exposure use less leverage. Specifically, we find that as the
functionality of the political system increases, as disruptive political changes become less
likely, and as profits are easier to repatriate, real estate firms take on more leverage. In sum,
the relation between political risk and firm leverage appears to be robust to the selection of
book versus market leverage metrics.
Table 6 Determinants of book leverage for Asia-Pacific real estate companies
Variables
Intercept
Political risk variables
Political rights index
Political change index
R-Factor
Similarity measures
Time to export
Procedures required to register
property
Market cap / GDP
Broadband per 100
% of GDP spent on primary education
Female participation in labor force
Financial/regulatory characteristics
Legal origin

(I)
0.005 (0.07)

(II)
(III)
−0.045 (−0.71) 0.039 (0.60)

−3.475a
(−5.13)

(IV)
0.026 (0.44)

0.059 (1.49)

−3.085a
(−3.53)
0.096 (1.15)
0.117a (3.39)

−0.022b
−0.023a
(−2.54)
(−2.65)
−0.001 (−0.01) 0.008 (0.12)

−0.017c
(−1.92)
0.048 (0.67)

−0.023b
(−2.59)
−0.016 (−0.24)

−0.000 (−0.05)
0.010 (0.72)
0.002 (0.20)
0.009 (1.43)

−0.000 (−1.28)
0.023c (1.70)
0.011 (1.38)
0.006 (1.09)

−0.000 (−0.69)
0.004 (0.29)
0.002 (0.24)
0.011c (1.79)

−0.000 (−0.20)
0.014 (0.94)
−0.000 (−0.05)
0.007 (1.07)

3.908a (3.89)

−0.624 (−1.18) −0.662 (−1.00) 2.384c (1.93)

0.274a (4.60)

Variables
Business freedom
Bank dominated
US 10-yr rate
Tax rate
GAAP
General firm characteristics
Asset tangibility
Total assets
Profitability
Growth options
Lagged leverage
REIT specific attributes
Secured debt
Rated debt
Split bond ratings
Asset age
Repurchases
Operating leverage
Lease payments
Total countries
Development
Observations
R-Squared
Property type fixed effects

(I)
0.097 (1.77)
0.041c (1.93)
1.064 (1.15)
−0.076 (−1.25)

(II)
−0.017 (−0.31)
0.099a (5.27)
0.231 (0.26)
−0.071 (−1.24)

(IV)
−0.021 (−0.37)
0.033c (1.67)
0.422 (0.46)
−0.082 (−1.46)

0.014 (0.84)

(III)
−0.003 (−0.05)
0.102a (4.38)
0.976 (0.94)
−0.131b
(−2.18)
−0.021 (−1.18)

0.005 (0.36)
−0.036 (−1.02)
0.000 (0.39)
−0.143a
(−4.14)
0.031c (1.84)
0.403a (12.10)

−0.027 (−0.73)
0.000 (0.29)
−0.142a
(−3.98)
0.036b (2.24)
0.407a (12.21)

0.024 (0.65)
−0.000 (−0.57)
−0.201a
(−5.57)
0.036c (1.91)
0.420a (13.21)

−0.024 (−0.68)
0.000 (0.76)
−0.139a
(−3.90)
0.032b (1.98)
0.390a (11.74)

−0.000 (−0.02)
−0.006 (−0.58)
0.008 (0.47)
0.001 (0.24)
−0.008 (−0.23)
−0.001 (−0.45)
−0.586 (−0.32)
0.006b (2.36)
0.007 (0.75)
1,066
0.602
Yes

−0.000 (−0.04)
−0.008 (−0.72)
0.015 (0.86)
−0.001 (−0.35)
−0.022 (−0.65)
−0.000 (−0.10)
−0.615 (−0.32)
0.008a (2.96)
0.006 (0.61)
1,066
0.603
Yes

−0.000 (−0.40)
−0.004 (−0.31)
−0.009 (−0.45)
0.000 (0.20)
−0.022 (−0.64)
−0.001 (−0.78)
−1.265 (−0.64)
0.007a (2.72)
0.014 (1.38)
1,066
0.579
Yes

0.000 (0.70)
−0.012 (−1.14)
0.009 (0.48)
−0.000 (−0.15)
−0.018 (−0.50)
−0.000 (−0.12)
−0.510 (−0.26)
0.006b (2.12)
0.013 (1.30)
1,066
0.612
Yes

c

−0.011 (−0.68)

This table presents the results of four regressions investigating the determinants of Asia-Pacific real estate firms’
use of leverage. The first three models regresses the firm’s Book Leverage against our three measures of political
risk separately, while controlling for the financial and regulatory standards, as well as firm and industry level
variables. In Model (1), the Political Rights Index is used. In Model (2) the Political Change Index is utilized, while
Model (3) employs the R-Factor. Model (4) includes all three of our political risk measures. The t-tests reported in
parenthesis are all based on standard errors clustered by firm
aIndicates statistical significance at 1 % level
bIndicates statistical significance at 5 % level
cIndicates statistical significance at 10 % level

Robustness
High Versus Low Market-to-Book REITs
Billet et al. (2007) find evidence that leverage relations differ systematically between high and
low market-to-book value firms. Therefore, we next split our sample between high and low
market-to-book Asia-Pacific real estate firms, re-estimate our base model specifications on
these subsamples, and report the results in Table 7. Panel A presents the results of our
analysis examining the low market-to-book tercile. The results remain consistent with our full
sample findings. Specifically, as the functionality of the political process in the countries where
the REIT or listed property trust holds investment properties are located increases, and as

organizational cash flows become easier to repatriate back to the home country, firms employ
more leverage.
Table 7 Determinants of leverage by high versus low market-to-book value ratios for Asia-Pacific real
estate companies
Variables
(I)
Panel A: market leverage, lowest MTB tercile
Intercept
0.370a (2.47)
Political rights index
−4.739b (−3.32)
Political change index
R-Factor
Observations
345
R-Squared
0.747
Property type fixed effects
Yes
Control variables
Yes
Panel B: market leverage, highest MTB tercile
Intercept
0.226b (3.19)
Political rights index
−2.252c (−1.98)
Political change index
R-Factor
Observations
345
R-Squared
0.642
Property Type Fixed Effects
Yes
Control Variables
Yes

(II)
0.299a (2.06)

(III)
0.310a (2.07)

0.384b (3.83)
345
0.746
Yes
Yes

0.152c (1.66)
345
0.730
Yes
Yes

0.216b (2.95)

0.287b (3.73)

0.102 (1.12)
345
0.638
Yes
Yes

0.075 (1.41)
345
0.639
Yes
Yes

(IV)
0.387b (2.67)
−4.807a (−2.44)
0.095 (0.59)
0.243b (3.10)
345
0.760
Yes
Yes
0.322b (4.39)
−4.919b (−2.93)
−0.132 (−1.01)
0.159b (3.03)
345
0.653
Yes
Yes

This table presents the results of four regressions investigating the determinants of Asia-Pacific real estate firms’
use of leverage. Each model regresses the firm’s Leverage ratio against the three measures of political risk
separately, while controlling for the financial and regulatory standards, as well as firm and industry level variables.
In Model (1), the Political Rights Index is used. In Model (2) the Political Change Index is utilized, while Model (3)
employs the R-Factor. Model (4) includes all three of our political risk measures. Panel A reflects an analysis of
the lowest tercile of MTB firms, while Panel B reports results for the highest tercile. The t-tests reported in
parenthesis are all based on standard errors clustered by firm
aIndicates statistical significance at 5 % level
bIndicates statistical significance at 1 % level
cIndicates statistical significance at 10 % level

Similarly, Panel B presents the results of our analysis for the high market-to-book tercile. Once
again, we find results that are qualitatively consistent with our a priori expectations. While not
as statistically robust, Political Rights and R-Factor both remain consistent with our full sample
findings, and again suggest that as a real estate firm’s political risk exposure increases the
company employs less leverage.

Security Issuance Decisions
Finally, we also examine the sub-sample of firms that issue securities, as these firms are
actively accessing the capital market and thereby consciously making a capital structure
decision. Table 8 presents the results of this analysis. Once again, within this more restrictive
and conceptually relevant subsample, we generally find that as political risk exposure

increases Asia-Pacific real estate firms employ less leverage. Political Rights, Political
Change, and R-Factor all tend to be both directionally and statistically consistent with our full
sample findings, again implying that as political risk exposure increases, REITs and listed
property trusts take on less leverage.23 Taken together, the results presented in Tables 7 and 8
suggest our results are robust to different sub-sample analyses, and are not an artificial
construct based upon the idiosyncrasies of a particular sampling methodology.
Table 8 Determinants of leverage for security issuing Asia-Pacific real estate companies
Variables
Intercept
Political rights index
Political change index
R-Factor
Observations
R-Squared
Property type fixed effects
Control variables

(I)
0.374 (4.11)
−2.360b (−2.14)
a

(II)
0.351 (3.93)
a

(III)
0.457 (4.41)

(IV)
0.441 (4.67)
−3.112b (−2.09)
−0.025 (−0.18)

0.106 (1.65)
460
0.687
Yes
Yes

0.142b (2.14)
460
0.694
Yes
Yes

a

0.174c (1.81)
460
0.689
Yes
Yes

460
0.689
Yes
Yes

a

This table presents the results of four regressions investigating the determinants of Asia-Pacific real estate firms’
use of leverage. Each model regresses the firm’s Leverage ratio against the three measures of political risk
separately, while controlling for the financial and regulatory standards, as well as firm and industry level variables.
In Model (1), the Political Rights Index is used. In Model (2) the Political Change Index is utilized, while Model (3)
employs the R-Factor. Model (4) includes all three of our political risk measures. The sample is restricted to only
firms that raised capital in the secondary market during a given year. The t-tests reported in parenthesis are all
based on standard errors clustered by firm
aIndicates statistical significance at 1 % level
bIndicates statistical significance at 5 % level
cIndicates statistical significance at 10 % level

Summary and Conclusions
As financial markets become increasingly integrated, researchers must investigate and
understand how cross-border considerations influence firm decision making. Along this line of
inquiry, we examine how jurisdictional differences in the countries that Asia-Pacific REITs hold
investment properties in impact the firm’s debt capacity. In general, we find that for real estate
firms holding real estate investments across international boundaries, leverage is not just a
function of financial risk, but also the political risk associated with the properties in which the
firm invests. More specifically, after controlling for both traditional and REIT specific
determinants of firm leverage, we find that as 1) the efficiency of government functioning
increases, 2) the probability or expected financial impact of political turmoil decreases, and 3)
the ability to repatriate cash flows back to the home country of the firm increases, real estate
firms employ more debt. These results hold regardless of whether debt is measured in terms of
either book or market leverage, and are robust to alternative estimation subsamples including
market-to-book value terciles and subsamples of only capital raising firms. Taken together,
these results provide strong evidence that political risk exerts significance influence over the
capital structure decisions of Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property trusts.

Footnotes
1 While one could easily foresee such constraints manifesting themselves in the form of performance
differentials across firms, that does not have to be the case. More specifically, limited access to
capital may also serve to mitigate potential diseconomies of scale and/or agency problems
related to managerial empire building.
2 Burgman (1996) measures political risk as the ratio of the Euromoney 20 safest countries invested in
to total countries invested in.
3 Similarly, Deng et al. (2013) argue organizational form and operational transparency are inextricably
related. To the extent political risk influences a firm’s optimal organizational structure, it could
easily result in observable differences in firm transparency and/or performance.
4 The theoretical foundations of trade-off theory date back to the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller
(1958, 1963). For a broad overview of alternative capital structure theories, see Harris and
Raviv (1991). They not only discuss trade-off theory, but also leverage models based upon
agency costs, corporate control considerations, and product/input market interactions.
5 Specifically, Lou (2008) and Tan (2009) report Australian and Singapore REITs are generally
exempt from REIT level taxation, while Japanese REITs are subject to tax, but their distributions
are often deductible. In South Korea, general REITs are subject to regular income tax
provisions, however corporate restructuring REITs (CR-REITs) are exempt provided the
minimum 90 % distribution requirements are met. Hong Kong REITs also enjoy tax advantages
as they do not face withholding taxes, capital gains taxes, or income taxes on earnings
generated from overseas operations.
6 For further discussion and insight into the limitations of applying trade-off theory to REIT markets, see
Howe and Shilling (1988)
7 See, for example, Feng et al. (2007), Boudry et al. (2010), and Harrison et al. (2011).
8 Interestingly, while conventional wisdom amongst both academics and real estate industry
practitioners holds that REITs are effectively capital constrained in the sense they cannot retain
large shares of annual operating profits, Wang et al. (1993) and Bradley et al. (1998) both
report average REIT dividend payout ratios well in excess of 100 % of taxable income. Given
the large depreciation and amortization allowances real property investments often provide,
cash flow (and funds from operations) frequently exceeds reported taxable income by vast
amounts. To the extent this phenomenon holds within the Asia-Pacific market, concerns over
the applicability of pecking-order theory may be overblown.
9 Empirical and anecdotal support for the market timing hypothesis within non-REIT firms may be found
in Graham and Harvey (2001) and Baker and Wurgler (2002).
10 Additional studies suggesting a positive relation between firm size and leverage ratios include Maris
and Elayan (1990), Jaffe (1991), Fama and French (2002), Baker and Wurgler (2002), and
Barclay et al. (2006).
11 Consistent with this reasoning, Titman and Wessels (1988), Fama and French (2002), and Barclay
et al. (2006), among others, all document a negative relation between firm profitability and
leverage.
12 While the preponderance of the evidence seems to suggest a negative relation between growth
options and firm leverage, the findings are not unanimous in this conclusion. For example,
Titman and Wessels (1988) fail to find statistically significant evidence, either positive or
negative, of a relation between growth options and leverage. Similarly, Feng et al. (2007)
present evidence suggesting these relations within their REIT market sample appear to be
context specific with some model specifications resulting in positive observed relations between
growth options and leverage, while other specifications come to exactly the opposite conclusion.
13 Faulkender and Petersen (2006) arrive at similar conclusions for non-REIT firms.
14 See, for example, Livingston et al. (2007) and Helwege and Liang (1996).

15 Credit rationing, in this context, can take the form of either volume or price restrictions. Volume
restrictions, by definition, will reduce observed debt ratios. Similarly, price adjustments will drive
borrowing costs up, leaving fewer firms ready, willing, and able to profitably deploy the borrowed
funds. Thus, regardless of the nature of the credit rationing, lower debt ratios are expected to
prevail.
16 Note, of the 187 sample firms, 119 hold investment properties located exclusively within a single
country and hence have index values which correspond directly to that country’s Political Rights
Index, Political Change Index, and R-Factor. For the remaining 68 firms holding assets across
multiple jurisdictions, we weight location specific index values for our Political Rights Index,
Political Change Index, and R-Factor metrics by the fraction of each firm’s investment portfolio
located within each specific country. These property weighted averages are each designed to
capture alternative dimensions of political risk, and taken together should provide unique insight
into the influence of political risk on firm capital structure decisions.
17 We readily acknowledge that to the extent restrictive economic environments erect artificial barriers
to entry for new firms, existing firms may be insulated from competitive market pressures, enjoy
monopolistic or oligopolistic market power, and thus exhibit an enhanced debt capacity.
18 A broad literature exists addressing the dynamics and differences between bank dominated and
market dominated economic systems. For further details, discussion, and analysis of these
issues, see Allen and Gale (2001), Levine (2002), Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999, 2004),
and Chakraborty and Ray (2006).
19 For the purposes of the current investigation, in the spirit of Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999,
2004), we define an economic system as being bank dominated if the ratio of domestic assets
of deposit money banks to market capitalization is less than 1.10. Alternative proxies using
differential cut-off values, or employing classifications provided by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine
(1999, 2004), produce virtually identical results.
20 See, for example, Senbet (1979) for further discussion of the role of international tax differentials on
the optimal capital structure of the firm.
21 All significance tests presented in the multivariate analysis are based on standard errors clustered at
the firm level. Additionally, we note that we do not include year and country fixed effects, as
these are perfectly correlated with several of our control variables. However, in unreported tests
where we remove these controls and include fixed effects we find qualitatively similar results.
See Petersen (2009) for further discussion of these issues.
22 Additionally, we note that in unreported tests splitting the sample between firms that invest in a
single country and those that invest across multiple countries we find qualitatively similar results
for our Political Risk metrics.
23 We observe similar, but somewhat less statistically significant results when we split the sample
between debt and equity issuers.
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Appendix
Political Rights Index

This is the property weighted average of the Freedom of the World Political
Rights Index. Higher values indicate a government that is less functional.
Political Change Index This is the property weighted average of the Business Risk Service Political
Risk Index. Higher values indicate that political change which will materially
affect business is less likely.
R-Factor
This is the property weighted average of the Business Risk Service
remittances and repatriation of capital factor. Higher values indicate that it is
relatively easy to repatriate profits.
Time to Export
This is the property weighted average of the minimum time it takes (in days)
to export products from a country, as reported by the World Bank.
Procedures required to This is the property weighted average of the minimum number of procedures
register property
required for a business to secure rights to a property, as reported by the
World Bank.
Market Cap / GDP
This is the property weighted average of the ratio of the equity market
capitalization of domestic firms to a country’s GDP, as reported by the World
Bank.
Broadband per 100
This is the property weighted average of the number of broadband
subscribes per 100 people, as reported by the World Bank.
% of GDP spent on
This is the property weighted average of the percent of GDP spent per
primary education
student on primary school education, as reported by the World Bank.
Female participation in This is the property weighted average of the proportion of females who
labor force
actively participate in the work force, as reported by the World Bank.
Legal Origin
This is the percent of the real estate company’s properties that are located in
countries where the legal system is based on Civil Law foundations.
Business Freedom
This is the property weighted average of the Heritage Foundation’s Business
Freedom Index.
Bank Dominated
This is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the ratio of domestic
assets of deposit money banks to total equity market capitalization is less
than 1.10.
US 10-year Rate
This is the interest rate on the 10-year U.S. constant maturity Treasury note.
Tax Rate
This is the highest corporate tax rate applicable in the country where the real
estate company is headquartered. The Tax Rate is set to 0 for all REITs.
GAAP
This is an indicator variable set to 1 if the firm uses GAAP financial reporting
standards; 0 if the firm employs IFRS.
Asset Tangibility
Total Real Estate Operations / Total Assets.
Total Assets
Total Assets reported in US dollars.
Profitability
FFO / Total Assets.
Growth Options
Market Capitalization / (Total Assets - Total Debt).
Lagged Leverage
Lagged value of leverage.
Secured Debt
Secured Debt / Total Debt.
Rated Debt
This is an indicator variable set to 1 if the firm has rated debt outstanding; 0
otherwise.
Split Bond Ratings
An indicator variable set to 1 if two or more rating agencies have different
notch level long-term issuer credit ratings for the firm; 0 otherwise.

Asset Age
Repurchases
Operating Leverage
Lease Payments
Total Countries
Development

Time since SNL first recorded the firm’s total assets.
An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm’s shares outstanding declines by
more than 2 % over a given year; 0 otherwise.
The change in FFO / change in revenue: Windsorized.
The firm’s total committed capital lease obligations / Total Assets.
The number of different countries in which the firm owns investment
properties.
An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm engages in investment property
development, construction programs, or has an active property development
pipeline; 0 otherwise.
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